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HOME RULE
In 1973, Congress enacted the District of Columbia Self-Government
and Governmental Reorganization Act.' This Act created a locally-
elected government and gave it broad authority over District affairs.
The Self-Government Act created a unique legislative process for the
District. Under the Act, permanent District of Columbia Council legisla-
tion must undergo two readings or votes and a period of congressional
review.2 In contrast, emergency Council legislation needs one reading
only and no congressional review, but requires a two-thirds vote of the
Council. However, emergency legislation may remain effective for no
more than ninety days.3
The scope of the ninety-day limit on emergency legislation was before
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in District of Columbia v. Wash-
ington Home Ownership Council, Inc. 4 Prior to this case, the Council had
routinely adopted successive substantially identical acts under its' emer-
gency powers. In Washington Home Ownershp Council, Inc., the court de-
clared that Congress intended the emergency process as an exception to
the required two readings and congressional review and held that the
Council may not adopt successive substantially identical legislation in re-
sponse to the same emergency.5 In a footnote, however, the court hinted
that a congressional recess that delays the permanent legislative process
may itself constitute a new emergency sufficient to waive two readings and
congressional review.6
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals disapproved another council
action in United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.7 The
1. D.C. CODE §§ 1-121 to -171 (Supp. V 1978 & Supp. VII 1980).
2. Id §§ 1-146(a) (Supp. V 1978) & 1-147(c)(1) (Supp. VII 1980). If Congress fails to
pass a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 legislative days, which exclude weekends,
holidays, and recesses of more than three days, a Council act becomes law. Id § 1-147(c)(1)
(Supp. VII 1980). Budget acts, however, do not become law until both houses of Congress
adopt them. Id § 47-224 (Supp. V 1978). Criminal statutes may be disapproved by either
house within 30 legislative days. Id § 1-147(c)(2) (Supp. V 1978 & Supp. VII 1980).
3. Id § 1-146(a) (Supp. V 1978).
4. 415 A.2d 1349 (D.C. 1980) (en banc).
5. Id at 1359.
6. Id at 1359 n.20. The District had contended that permanent legislation often can-
not be enacted within 90 days. Id at 1356. The court, however, noted that an emergency
act could also be adopted on first reading simultaneously. Id at 1356-57.
7. 418 A.2d 114 (D.C. 1980).
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Council, using its authority to close unneeded alleys,8 had conditioned the
closing of several alleys-which had been created when the original Dis-
trict was laid out in 1791-upon the payment of their fair market value by
adjacent property owners. The court rejected a previous decision of the
United States Court of Claims9 and held that the government never had
title to the District's original alleys.' ° As a result, the Council could not
condition the closing of an original alley upon the payment of money."
Another major case, Don't Tear It Down, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Avenue
Development Corp. ,"2 also limited the Council's power. In this case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit per-
mitted the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation, created by
Congress in 1972, to demolish a historic landmark, in connection with the
redevelopment of a downtown neighborhood, without complying with the
District of Columbia Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection
Act,' 3 enacted by the Council in 1979. The court found the Act's hearing
requirement for demolishing landmarks to be incompatible with the Cor-
poration's purpose and thus exempted the Corporation from this require-
ment.14
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8. D.C. CODE § 7-401 (1973).
9. Washington Medical Center, Inc. v. United States, 545 F.2d 116, 123-24 (Ct. Cl.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977) (government has title to District's original alleys).
10. 418 A.2d at 119, 121 (D.C. 1980).
11. Relying on principles of collateral estoppel, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit reached this conclusion in Cart v. District of Columbia, 646
F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
12. 642 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
13. D.C. CODE §§ 5-821 to -835 (Supp. VII 1980).
14. 642 F.2d at 536-38.
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